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Abstract
We develop a theory of worker discretion over task choice within a Þrm. In-
creasing the workers’ discretion has a trade-o  between the gains from workers
using private information about their abilities, and the costs from adverse selection
within the Þrm due to workers herding into prestigious tasks. The theory leads
to the result that, in line with the Peter Principle, misallocation of talent within
Þrms takes the form of too many workers undertaking tasks with a high return to
ability. Moreover we Þnd that the degree of misallocation of talent is decreasing in
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11 Introduction
A key factor to the success of a company is the extent to which its employees work on
tasks, or specialize, in accordance with their abilities. For example, hi-tech companies
want their most talented programmers to work with creative tasks like new software
development, and their less talented programmers to work with more routine tasks, like
the updating of old software, user-support and code documentation.
In principle, a Þrm has two ways to ensure a good match between employees and
tasks — to assign employees to tasks or to let the employees decide which tasks to work
on. The traditional way of ensuring a good match between workers and work content,
as evidenced by hiring procedures in government bureaucracies, is to Þrst deÞne the
tasks contained in job slots and then to hire suitable workers (or to reallocate existing
workers) to Þll the slots, giving workers limited discretion in deÞning their work content.
In recent years, the bureaucratic, ’Weberian’, solution has been challenged by Þrms with
innovative management practices. For example, as described by Baron & Kreps (1999),
the engineering company Sun Hydraulics gives employees ’the right and responsibility to
choose how they spend their time,’ and Gore & Ass., the producer of Gore-Tex c ° products,
encourages ’maximum freedom for each employee.’
While these two examples are extreme, they seem to be part of mainstream managerial
thinking, as evidenced by the huge popularity of ’The One-Minute Manager’ (Blanchard
& Johnson, 1981),’ a management ‘bible’, advocating such maxims as [a good manager
should not] believe in participating in any of [his] sta ’s decisionmaking.’1 Reasonably,
however, most Þrms lie somewhere in between government bureaucracies and Sun Hy-
draulics, in that workers have some, but not complete, discretion over their Þeld of work.
In this paper we construct a theory of worker discretion that in a simple manner ac-
commodates the discretion rules of Sun Hydraulics, bureaucracies, and points in between.
Furthermore, we investigate the relation between a Þrm’s discretion rule and the degree
of misallocation of workers within the Þrm. For example, can we expect Þrms with a high
degree of worker discretion to have a higher degree of misallocation of talent within the
1Increased worker discretion may also be seen as part of a more general workplace trend emphasizing
job rotation, matrices, and self-monitoring groups (Lindbeck & Snower, 1996, 2000, 2001).
2Þrm?
Our theory of discretion is based on the Þrm balancing o  the gains from workers
exploiting their private information and the cost of career concerns. Worker private
information favors giving workers a high degree of discretion in specialization, because such
private information means that workers are better equipped to assess their correct task.
On the other hand, however, career concerns may lead workers to choose specialization
strategically, if given the discretion. For example, if the most-able workers in a Þrm
specialize in developing new products, it may be beneÞcial for less-able workers (if they
were given the choice) to also specialize in product development, and thereby be associated
with high ability by the market, even if that would lower their productivity. That Þrms
with a high degree of worker discretion can experience such misallocation inside the Þrm,
away from routine tasks into more prestigious tasks, is indicated by the observation that
Sun Hydraulics for an extensive period had problems with personnel not updating the
product catalogue (Kaftan, 1984).2
Given these concerns that a high degree of discretion will cause workers to herd into
prestigious tasks, one would expect that the degree of discretion given to workers and the
degree of misallocation of labor input would be positively related. However, when taking
into account the contractual response by Þrms to the herding motive, i.e., in equilibrium,
we Þnd that more discretion is associated with less misallocation. Hence while it may be
true that more discretion leads to more misallocation for a given Þrm, the hypothesis we
obtain for a cross-section of Þrms is that Þrms with a higher level of discretion have a
lower degree of misallocation.
To model a Þrm’s choice of discretion rule, we construct a model with two types of
workers, low and high ability, and two types of tasks, ‘easy’ and ‘di!cult’. An e!cient
allocation of workers occurs when the low ability workers specialize in the easy task, and
the high ability workers specialize in the di!cult task. Firms can only condition payment
to an employee on his choice of task and on his level of e ort. There are two periods. In
the Þrst period, Þrms o er contracts to the workers, and workers choose which Þrm to
work for and which task to work on. Before the second period, the inside Þrm knows with
2Perhaps the herding of scientiÞc activity into ‘promising’ venues of research, where the top researchers
go, is an example of a similar type of misallocation.
3certainty which task each employee worked on in the Þrst period (but not necessarily his
type), while the market receives merely an imperfect, public, signal. In the second period,
the Þrms make o ers simultaneously to each employee, and workers accept the highest
o er.
There are two types of equilibria: separating and rationing. In a separating equilib-
rium, employees are given full discretion in task choice and a wage scheme is designed such
that workers separate themselves to their e!cient tasks. This high-discretion equilibrium
resembles play in companies such as Sun Hydraulics and Gore & Ass., where the allocation
of employees inside the Þrm to a large extent is decided by the individual employee. In
rationing equilibria, in contrast, only a fraction of employees (which may be equal to zero)
are given discretion over task choice, and the remaining employees are assigned to a task.
A rationing equilibrium with a high degree of assignment resembles play in bureaucracies,
with little or no worker discretion over specialization, while a rationing equilibrium with
a moderate degree of assignment resembles play in typical Þrms, where only a fraction of
workers are given discretion in specialization, for example, through trainee programs or
work matrices.
The degree of discretion in equilibrium depends on the market observability of the
task choices of individual workers. When the market observability is high, due e.g., coor-
dination problems within the Þrm requiring clear job titles, or due to political regulations
promoting transparency, the di!cult task becomes more attractive for low workers, due
to the herding motive. To counteract this e ect, Þrms assign workers tasks, in order to
reduce market information about employee quality.
The assignment to tasks in rationing equilibria implies that workers’ private informa-
tion is not used e!ciently, and a misallocation of workers occurs in equilibrium. Intu-
itively, one may think that the greatest source of misallocation arising from assignment
is able workers that are not permitted to work in the di!cult task. It turns out, how-
ever, that the ‘mistake’ made by Þrms in our model is the opposite: too many workers
are assigned to the di!cult task. This result accords with the Peter principle,3 in that
the prime source of misallocation occurs due to workers being allocated to tasks above
3The Peter principle (Peter & Hull, 1969) states that in a hierarchy, employees are promoted to their
incompetence level.
4their competence level (rather than the source of misallocation being that able workers
are occupied below their competence level).
A large literature builds on Akerlof (1970) to consider adverse selection in the labor
market (e.g., Greenwald, 1986, and Acemoglu & Pische 1998), which occurs when workers
know more about their abilities than Þrms do. This literature implicitly assumes that
the workers ability is revealed to the Þrm once hired. The novelty of our approach is that
Þrms face two adverse selection problems, when hiring workers, and when allocating these
workers within the Þrm.
The assignment literature, e.g., Rosen (1982) and Gibbons & Waldman (1999a), con-
siders how the Þrm should allocate workers to tasks, in settings where workers and Þrms
have symmetric information at the hiring stage. Hence there are no adverse selection
problems in this literature.4 5
Aghion & Tirole (1997) considers a setting where a principal may delegate the au-
thority over a project choice to an agent. Giving the agent a higher degree of authority
increases the agent’s e ort, but also increases the probability that a project with high
(exogenous) private beneÞts for the agent — but low principal beneÞts — is chosen. The
present paper complements Aghion & Tirole (1997) by focusing on adverse selection rather
than moral hazard (provision of e ort) issues related to degree of discretion (or authority).
In addition, we consider the issues of career concerns and misallocation, not considered
by that paper.6
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we construct the model, and in
Section 3 we present the main results, and Section 4 concludes.
4The same point applies for the literature on career concerns, as in Holmstrom (1982/1999), two
exceptions being Prendergast & Stole (1996) and Hvide (2002). Prendergast & Stole (1996) models a sit-
uation where managers have private information about investments projects, and Hvide (2002) considers
a model where workers learn (more than Þrms) about their abilities through undertaking education.
5Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) considers which tasks should be included in the description of a job,
and how to give incentives such that workers undertake all those tasks, while we ask how the Þrm should
make the workers specialize e!ciently.
6Prendergast (1996) considers a setting where the manager decides which projects to take on, and
which projects to leave to the worker. Due to concerns about building his own human capital base,
the manager takes on too many tasks. Due to lack of worker private information, there is no notion of
attempting to exploit worker’s competence in designing jobs in this paper.
52 The Model
Here we Þrst describe the technology and contracts of the model, and then the timing.
2.1 Technology and Contracts
There is a continuum of workers and two Þrms.7 Each worker privately knows whether he
has either low or high ability, while Þrms know the probability of a worker being high ( ),
but individual workers are indistinguishable.8 In each Þrm, there are two tasks, ‘Easy’
and ‘Di!cult’, denoted by E and D. Task E requires the e ort level eE to be completed
for both worker type. Given that eE is exerted, both workers have the same productivity
in the E task, !0. Task E requires the e ort level eD to be completed. Given that eD is
exerted, the low type has productivity !L in the D task, and the high type has productivity
!H, where !L < !H. For example, we can think of e ort as the time spent on doing a
certain task and ! as the quality of the marginal product of a worker. We assume that
the cost of e ort is identical across workers. For simplicity, we normalize the cost of low
e ort to zero, and the cost of high e ort to c, i.e., c(eE) = 0, and c(eD) = c.9 We conÞne
attention to the case when it is e!cient that high workers are allocated to task D and for
low workers to be allocated to task E, which occurs when !H ! c > !0 > !L ! c.
We assume that the only contractible variables are the workers’ choice of e ort and
their choice of task. Conditional on the correct e ort level being exerted, Þrms o er
one wage for the D task and one wage for the E task.10 If an incorrect level of e ort is
exerted, it is assumed that the wage to a worker is zero. The case when individual output
is contractible is considered in Appendix D, where we show that our basic results (under
certain conditions) hold under such a modiÞcation.
7All the results can be generalized to the case with more than two Þrms.
8Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) considers the allocation of workers to di erent tasks within an agricultural
market in Philippines, and Þnd evidence that asymmetric information is present.
9Di erences in the cost of e ort for the two types of workers would create qualitatively similar results
to those obtained.
10It may seem odd that an o er by a Þrm is a vector of wages, rather than just a wage. However, we
can interpret the vector as reßecting di erences in overtime payment or fringe beneÞts between the two
possible tasks.
6All workers and Þrms are risk neutral, and there is no discounting. We assume that
if the incentive scheme is such that a worker is indi erent between doing the E task or
the D task (taking into account the implicit incentives), he will choose the task that is
e!cient for him. This may be due to an (unmodeled) option plan or ownership share, or
alternatively due to increased job satisfaction in the e!cient task.
2.2 Timing
In the Þrst period, workers are born knowing their ability level and the two Þrms compete
in attracting them. Firms o er contracts lasting one period. Assuming that workers exert
the correct level of e ort, a Þrm o ers workers wD
1 for the D task and wE
1 for the E task.11
Given the o ers, workers choose for which Þrm to work. Before workers choose their task,
a Þrm has the option to raise any of the wages {wD
1 , wE
1 } o ered. In other words, Þrms
can commit to not lowering wages, but may choose to raise one of them. This is a natural
requirement, because both the Þrm and workers would (weakly) prefer such a reneged
contract.12 Although such wage raises do not occur in equilibrium, it will turn out to
have an impact on equilibrium. Finally, workers choose task, and production takes place.
After the Þrst period, the two Þrms bid for the workers. The inside Þrm (a worker’s
Þrst period employer) is assumed to be fully informed about the task choice of the worker.
The outside Þrm (the competitor of a worker’s Þrst period employer), however, receives
some public, imprecise signal about the task performed (or the wage) by a worker.
To Þx ideas, we can think of the signal precision, which is exogenous in the model, as
determined by the extent to which job titles and salaries are precise or di use. In this
respect, Sun Hydraulics lies at one end of the spectrum by not having job titles for its
employees, and a very covert pay policy, while bureaucracies, with well-deÞned job titles,
job descriptions, and salary ladders, being at the other end.
We model the public information about task choice of a worker in the Þrst period as
an independent realization of a random variable X.13 For simplicity, it is assumed that
11The workers are assumed to receive a wage equal to zero if an incorrect level of e ort is exerted.
12In technical terms, we are imposing the criterion of renegotation-proofness.
13We would obtain the qualitatively same results from assuming that X is only observable to the
outside Þrm, e.g., that X is a private signal.
7X can take just two values, E and D. If the worker is in task E, then X = E occurs with
probability p, and X = D occurs with probability 1 ! p. If the worker is in task D, then
X = D with probability p, and X = E occurs with probability 1 ! p, where 1
2 " p " 1,
and the larger p the higher precision of the signal (and the higher outside observability)
When p = 1, the inside Þrm and the outside Þrm are symmetrically informed after the
Þrst period.
Given the informational structure, the inside Þrm and the outside Þrm compete for
the workers before the second period. We assume that the bidding follows a Þrst-price
sealed-bid auction; each Þrm gives a single o er to a worker, in ignorance of the other
Þrm’s o er, and the worker accepts the highest o er.
3 Results
We Þrst present results on the separating equilibria, where both type of employees work on
their appropriate task in period 1. We then examine rationing equilibria, where at least
one of the tasks is occupied by both type of workers. Notice that there is no incentive for
worker misrepresentation after the contracts are signed in the second period, and Þrms
will simply o er all workers an excess payment of c for choosing the di!cult task in that
period, and an e!cient allocation of workers occur. Hence ine!ciencies, if they occur,
occur in the Þrst period.14
3.1 Separating equilibria
To study separating equilibria, we start out by analyzing equilibrium bidding for workers
in the second stage, given that a separating equilibrium is played in the Þrst stage. Recall
that when the sorting is e!cient at time 1, the inside Þrm knows the ability of a worker
before the second period, while the outside Þrm receives a noisy public signal about the
task choice of a worker in the Þrst period.
For notational convenience, we derive the following result assuming c = 0, in which
14The model can easily be extended to cover an arbitrary number of periods, in which case there can
be ine!ciencies in all periods except the last one.
8case a worker’s wage in the second period will not depend on which task he works on
in that period. Let wE
2 and wD
2 denote the expected second-period wage of a worker
that chose task E and D, respectively, in the Þrst period. wE
2 and wD
2 are the expected
maximum o ers before the second period.
Lemma 1 Given that a separating equilibrium is played,
(i) !0 " wE
2 < wD







Proof. For (i), see Appendix A, and for (ii), see Appendix B.
Lemma 1 gives the essential properties of the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium of the
bidding game between the inside Þrm and the outside Þrm, where the inside Þrm bids
conditional on the true type of each worker (since ability is revealed to the inside Þrm in a
separating equilibrium), and the outside Þrm bids conditional on the imperfect signal X.15
Part i) of Lemma 1 says that in a separating equilibrium, the wage in the second period is
higher for a worker that chose the di!cult task in the Þrst period than for a worker that
chose the easy task in the Þrst period. The intuition is that a worker that chooses the
di!cult task in the Þrst period enjoys better career prospects than a worker that chooses
the easy task in the Þrst period, since ability is (partially) revealed. Part ii) says that
the wage di erence in the second period is increasing in the precision of the noisy signal
observed by the outside Þrm. The intuition for part (ii) is that the more informative
signal, the more precise inference can be made from the signal about the ability type of a
worker before the second period. Hence the di erence in (expected) second period wages
for the low and high ability workers will be magniÞed by a higher informativeness of the
signal, as one would expect. When p = 1, the Þrms bid equally aggressively for both
types of workers before the second period, and we have that wE
2 = !0 and wD
2 = !H, i.e.,
wage equals productivity for both types.16 We can also notice that for p < 1, the inside
15As derived in Appendix A, the outside Þrm bids  0 for a fraction of workers. We can interpret such
a bid as ’no bid’.
16When the signal is completely uninformative (p = 1
2), the high workers receive a higher wage than
the low worker in the second period. In this case, the outside Þrm must bid equally aggressive for both
type of workers. The inside Þrm, however, bids more aggressively for the high workers than for the low
workers, since the former has a higher value to the Þrm.
9Þrm makes positive information rents in the second period (on the high workers), and
that these rents are o set by negative proÞts in the Þrst period.
The simultaneous bidding structure that underlies the results of Lemma 1 is realistic
for situations where Þrms may bid in turn, but where workers have no way of verifying the
o er made by one Þrm to the other Þrm. Hence Þrms make secret or unveriÞable o ers to
workers, so that a worker cannot start a ‘bidding war’ by presenting one Þrm with the o er
from the other Þrm.17 As shown in Appendix A, the bidding setup ensures that there will
be positive turnover between the two periods (and a higher turnover rate for low workers
than for high workers). Hence there will be a ‘lemons problem’ in equilibrium, but not
to the extent that trade breaks down, as in the sequential bidding setup of Greenwald
(1986).18
The following proposition describes the contracts and the wage dynamics of separating
equilibria. The proof and some additional results on wage dynamics are contained in
Appendix A.
Proposition 1 A separating equilibrium has the following properties:
i) Workers are given full discretion over task choice.
ii) Low (high) workers get a wage that is higher (lower)
than their marginal product in both periods.
iii) High workers have a steeper wage proÞle than low workers.
In a separating equilibrium, the contracts o ered by Þrms are such that each worker
expects the same lifetime monetary payment from choosing the easy task as for choosing




2 (for c > 0, the right side
17If Þrms can choose whether to give veriÞable o ers to workers or not, Hvide & Kaplan (2001) Þnds
that neither Þrms would give veriÞable o ers in equilibrium, in fear of starting a bidding war. Other
papers, e.g., Greenwald (1986) and Acemoglu & Pische (1998), have modeled the competition for workers
as a sequential auction where the inside Þrm can always match the o er made from the outside Þrm.
Since it is not obvious what the actual ’rules’ of the bidding game are, it is comforting that the properties
described in Lemma 1 also hold in more general auction models, for example in certain hybrid versions
of the auction studied and the auction considered by Greenwald (1986).
18Greenwald (1986) creates turnover by assuming one-sided ’utility shocks’ in disfavor of the inside
Þrm, i.e., an urge to change employer even if the inside Þrm o ers a higher wage.
10is greater than the left side, but still lifetime utilities are equal), and therefore workers
have incentive to sort themselves into their e!cient task. In a separating equilibrium, the
Þrm sets no limit to entry in any of the tasks, and we can interpret this equilibrium as a
situation where workers are hired and then given full discretion over their task choice. In a
separating equilibrium, wages are compressed during both periods, which occurs because
the identity of high-ability workers is not known. For an intuition for why high ability
workers have a steeper wage proÞle through time than low ability workers, recall that
high workers have better career prospects than low workers under separation, due to the
(partial) revelation of abilities in the market before the second period. To be willing to
separate, low workers must hence be compensated by a relatively high wage in the Þrst
period, which implies that the wage proÞle of high workers is steeper than the wage proÞle
of the low workers.
Several papers have shown that worker (nominal) wages and wage dispersion typically
increase over time (see Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b, for an excellent overview of the
careers in organization literature). In Appendix C, we show that separating equilibria
have these properties given that we accommodate a degree of human capital acquisition
between the two periods.
We now explain the conditions for existence of a high-discretion separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A separating equilibrium is more likely to exist for lower p.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In a separating equilibrium, the low workers are paid more than their marginal product
in the Þrst period, while the high workers get paid less than their marginal product, as
shown in Proposition 1, part ii). This creates a potential incentive for Þrms to deviate in
order to attract only high workers, by holding the o er for the di!cult task (wD
1 ) constant,
and lower the o er for entering the easy task (wE
1 ). However, when it is su!ciently
inexpensive for Þrms to make low ability workers choose the easy task instead of the
di!cult task once workers have entered the Þrm, by raising the o er wE
1 at that point,
such cream-skimming is not credible, and a separating equilibrium exists. When the signal
precision is high, it is cheap to revise the o er wE
1 upwards to the e ect that low workers
switch from the di!cult to the easy task. Hence a separating equilibrium is less likely to
11exist the higher p.
Since the full discretion in separating equilibria is fundamentally di erent from the
spirit of the assignment literature, and of principal-agent theory, such as expressed by
Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), where Þrms assign workers to do speciÞc tasks, it is natural
to discuss the plausibility of separating equilibria in light of documented management
practices. Baron & Kreps (1999) reports on the management practices of Sun Hydraulics
Corp., a company founded in 1970 to manufacture ßuid power products. The founder
of Sun, Robert Koski, deemed standard management tools such as organization charts
to be destructive, by restricting employee initiative and information. To deal with such
problems, Koski designed the organization to eschew with almost all forms of hierarchy
(to accord with State of Florida law, there is a President and a Controller). As Baron &
Kreps (1999), p. 87, put it : ‘Work [at Sun] is self-organized. [..] Individual workers retain
the right and responsibility to choose how they spend their own time.’19 In 1997, Sun’s
products apparently enjoyed a higher margin than competitors, and had a reputation for
outstanding quality.20
Separating equilibria Þt to several features of Sun. In particular, Sun is — in addition
to having a high degree of worker discretion — characterized by low degree of outside
observability. For example, job titles being non-existent at Sun (Baron & Kreps, 1999,
p. 295), it is di!cult for outside Þrms to assess the allocation of individual employees.
Also, the pay of individual workers is very covert information. Lacking solid empirical
evidence, it is hard to assess how wide-spread it is that Þrms induce a very high degree of
worker discretion. However, that high-discretion rules within Þrms are common beyond
the examples cited above is indicated by the study of Osterman (1994), which Þnds that
45% of employees in a representative sample of US companies have complete or large
19The degree of discretion given to workers at Sun can be illustrated by a case where an engineer had
been hired with a product development function in mind but had ‘become intrigued with the computer in
his Þrst days on the job, and since had concentrated entirely on creating new programming applications.’
(Kaftan, 1984).
20The following statement from W. L. Gore, founder of Gore & Associates, is an echo from Sun: ‘In
Gore & Ass., one of our basic principles is to encourage maximum freedom for each employee. There is
no need for bosses, assignment of tasks, establishing lines of command, deÞning channels of permitted
communication, and the like’ (Gore, 1990).
12discretion over the choice of work method.21
3.2 Rationing equilibria
We now consider the discretion policy of a Þrm when the degree of outside observability
is high, cream-skimming is credible, and separating equilibria consequently do not exist.
Proposition 3 i) For a high degree of outside observability, there exists a rationing equi-
librium, where only a fraction of workers are given the discretion to choose task, and the
remaining fraction of workers is assigned to the di cult task. (ii) There does not exist a
rationing equilibrium where any workers are assigned to the easy task. (iii) The fraction of
workers that are assigned increases in the degree of outside observability of task allocation
for individual workers.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the degree of outside observability is high, Þrms must ration the slots in one
of the tasks, in order to make the market learn less about the ability through the work
allocation.22 We can interpret such rationing as the Þrm hiring workers and then only
give a fraction of them discretion over task choice, and assign the remaining fraction of
workers. An alternative interpretation of rationing equilibria is that of job rotation; all
interested workers are allowed to do the easy task, but only a certain amount of time.
The intuition for why there cannot be a rationing equilibrium where the number of
slots in the di!cult task is rationed is that if the D slots were rationed the Þrm could
increase productivity without increasing costs of compensation, by letting more (high)
workers do the di!cult task.23
21Discretion over work method and discretion over task choice are strictly speaking two separate issues,
but it does not seem implausible that they are closely related.
22We surpress the mechanism in which the Þrm rations slots. Implicitly, it is assumed that the identity
of those workers that prefer a task, but are not allowed entry, is unknown to the Þrm. For example, a
Þrst-come Þrst-serve principle in determining entry would satisfy this assumption. We can modify this
implicit assumption and the same type of results would go through.
23If the production technology were such that the simple task must be done (as with the product
catalogue of Sun Hydraulics), a high degree of rationing in equilibrium implies that separate workers,
without the option to switch to the di!cult task, must be hired to do the easy task.
13The degree of rationing in a rationing equilibrium is determined by the degree of
outside observability, p. A higher p implies a higher degree of rationing, and when p = 1,
i.e., symmetric information between the inside and the outside Þrm, there can exist pooling
equilibria where all workers are assigned (such equilibria are considered in the numerical
example in the next section). Hence rationing equilibria captures both Þrms with a low
degree of worker discretion, as in government bureaucracies, and more typical Þrms, where
a certain fraction of employees are given discretion over their specialization.
Several papers have shown that employers have incentive to hide their best workers,
once the ability of these workers are known to the Þrm. In particular, the literature
on strategic promotions, Waldman (1984b), Bernhardt & Scoones (1993) and Bernhardt
(1995) show that a Þrm knowing individual workers’ ability may have incentive to delay
promotion for able workers. We show that the incentive to avoid revealing ability also
a ects the Þrm’s strategy before it learns about the ability of individual workers, through
design of the discretion rule. In rationing equilibria, a Þrm hides its best workers through
assignment even if it does not have private information about worker quality, but takes
into account the information about worker ability revealed to other Þrms in equilibrium.
It is somewhat surprising that rationing takes the form of assignment to the di!cult
task, not to the easy task. We can add plausibility to this result by considering an example.
A frequent complaint about bureaucracies is that too many persons are employed in plan-
ning, analysis and management tasks, rather than working on more customer-oriented,
clerical tasks (the Peter principle). We can interpret management as the di!cult task
and the clerical task as the easy task. The model then provides the following expla-
nation for having too many employees involved in management: such a practice dilutes
the quality of management employees, and makes it more di!cult for outside Þrms to
hire away high-quality employees and consequently cheaper for the bureaucracy to retain
them. Moreover, since this practice reduces the career advantages of persons involved in
management, it reduces the per worker costs of hiring lower level workers.24
24A di erent piece of evidence for rationing equilibria can be found in Lerner and Tirole (2000), which
proposes that the career concerns are a major reason that programmers freely contribute to open source
software with credit being assigned to each section of code written. Lerner & Tirole (2000) further claim
that this strong incentive cannot be utilized by for-proÞt Þrms for fear of having their best workers
14Finally, we can notice that if a Þrm simply decided not to assign the workers - and set
equal wages for the two tasks - low-quality workers would imitate high-quality workers
and herd into the more prestigious task (to obtain a higher future compensation), and
there would be harmful adverse selection of workers within the Þrm. The Þrm could have
improved productivity by moving the low ability workers from the di!cult task to the
easy task; however, only a worker knows if he should move and since this movement has
a career cost, he must compensated to make it. It is only worthwhile for the Þrm to
pay a compensation that is equal or less to the gain in productivity. In the rationing
equilibrium, the necessary compensation would satisfy this property since only some of
its low-ability workers are allowed to.25
3.3 Numerical example
In this section we Þrst summarize our Þndings so far, and then consider a numerical
example.
Separating equilibria are characterized by the Þrm hiring workers and then giving
them full discretion in deÞning their specialization, while in rationing equilibria, the Þrm
hires workers and only partly let the workers decide. There are two underlying factors
that determine the equilibrium played, and hence the degree of worker discretion. On one
hand, worker private information favors a high degree of discretion, because a worker is
better able to judge his appropriate specialization. On the other hand, career concerns
create problems, because a worker may have incentives to choose a specialization that
makes him look good to the market rather than in the interest of the Þrm.
To add realism to the example, we assume that (general) human capital acquisition in
the Þrst period results in second-period productivities given by g(.), where g(!L,!0,!H) =
plucked by other Þrms. To avoid this problem, a company can assign extra programmers to a project
and try to blur information as to which workers contributed the most. There is some evidence of such
bluring by the fact that Apple recently removed credits from its software (see Claymon, 1999), which,
from outside the Þrm, makes the list of possible contributors longer.
25If all the low-ability workers moved, this compensation would be high, since remaining in the di!cult
task would be a clear signal of high-ability. If only a few low-ability workers moved, this compensation
would be low.
15(!L + h,!0 + h,!H + h).
Example 1 Suppose   = 1/2, !0 = 1, !H = 6, !L = 1, c = 1, h = 1.
Notice that a high worker has a higher (net) productivity in the di!cult task, and
a low worker has a higher productivity in the easy task, since the di!cult task requires
more e ort. We illustrate the equilibria of the example, for varying values of p, by the
following Þgure.




The Þgure depicts the structure of equilibrium for varying p. For a low p, there exists
a high-discretion separating equilibrium, which conÞrms Proposition 1 and Proposition
2. When p increases to .77, there only exists a rationing equilibrium, where slots in the
E task are limited, due to the possibility of cream-skimming with separation: for a high
p, it becomes credible to pay a low wage for the easy task, because it is expensive to
make low workers switch tasks in the interim. Therefore, on the interval (.77,1) there
exists a rationing equilibrium where a fraction (1   f)of those workers that prefer to
work in the easy task are assigned to the D task (which conÞrms Proposition 3 (i)). The
fraction f decreases in p, due to the increased threat of cream-skimming (which conÞrms
Proposition 3 (iii)). When f increases, the degree of misallocation decreases, and the
welfare of workers increases.26 When p goes to 1, the rationing equilibrium becomes a
pooling equilibrium, where all workers are assigned to the D task.27
26It holds generally that the welfare of both type of worker decreases with p, since total wages are equal
across workers in both separating and rationing equilibria, and are higher in separating equilibria due to
the more e cient allocation of workers.
27Whether or not to have di!use or precise job descriptions could be a choice variable for the Þrm.
One cost of decreasing outside visibility through making job descriptions less precise could be increased
coordination costs inside the Þrm due to e.g., duplication of work.
16High workers earn more than low workers in both periods, and both type of workers
experience a wage increase between the two periods (for su ciently high values of p).
Moreover, high workers have a steeper wage schedule than low workers, for any value of
p, and the turnover rate is higher for low workers than for high workers.
We summarize the Þndings of the example in the following remark.
Remark 1 For example 1, there exists a separating equilibrium for p < .77. For p > .77,
there exists a rationing equilibrium where only a fraction f of the low workers are allowed
into the E task. The fraction f decreases in p, and for p = 1 there only exists a pooling
equilibrium, where no workers are allowed into the E task. High workers earn more than
low workers in both periods, and for su ciently high values of p, both type of workers
experience a wage increase between the two periods. High workers have a steeper wage
dynamics than low workers.
3.4 Misallocation of workers
We have provided a theory of discretion within Þrms, that in a tractable manner ac-
commodates the discretion rules of hi-tech Þrms such as Sun Hydraulics, giving a lot of
discretion, and (government) bureaucracies, giving a small amount of discretion to indi-
vidual workers, and points in between. We now wish to analyze the implications of this
theory of discretion to the issue of equilibrium misallocation of workers within Þrms.
Let us Þrst deÞne the misallocation of a worker as the di!erence between his produc-
tivity in equilibrium and that under a full information equilibrium. Then we have the
following.
Proposition 4 i)Misallocation of workers can occur in equilibrium, and is lower the
higher degree of discretion. ii)Misallocation occurs due to low ability workers perform-
ing the di cult task.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3.
In a one-period problem allocation problem, Þrms would simply pay a wage di!erence
equal to the di!erence in the cost of e!ort between the easy task and the di cult task,
give the workers full discretion, and an e cient allocation of workers would follow. The
17reason why misallocation takes place in our two-period economy is that Þrms realize that
by an e cient allocation, too much information would become public about the ability of
individual workers.
On the form of misallocation, we Þnd that too many workers are performing the
di cult task in low-discretion Þrms. In principle, such Þrms could improve productivity
by inducing (low ability) workers to move from the di cult task to the easy task, but the
necessary compensation to a worker for the career damage of being identiÞed as a low
worker would exceed the gain in productivity from the movement.
A natural question is what hypothesis we can derive on misallocation within Þrms for
a cross-section of Þrms from di!erent industries, where the Þrms in each industry have
the same p, but where p di!er between industries. For example, for public bureaucracies
there are political regulations, and economic reasons such as facilitating coordination
inside the organization, promoting transparency of job titles (and individual salaries).
On the other hand, we expect hi-tech Þrms, with a competitive environment and perhaps
less coordination problems inside the Þrm, to have a low p.
Proposition 5 The degree of misallocation and the degree of worker discretion is in-
versely related for a cross-section of Þrms
Proof. This result follows directly from Proposition 3.
Since increased outside observability gives less discretion and more misallocation, for a
cross-section of Þrms from di!erent industries, the degree of misallocation and the degree
of discretion given to workers is inversely related in equilibrium.28 From this result, we
expect a higher degree of misallocation of workers in public bureaucracies, than in Þrms
with a lower outside observability, such as in hi-tech Þrms.
This argument can provide a limit to the e ciency of reforms within the public sector,
an issue continuously debated in many countries. In the short term, bureaucracies could
keep the same level of production by downsizing and giving the retained workers a higher
28We can construct stories that could come up with a di!erent conclusion. One simple theory could
say that workers get a lot of discretion if managers are poorly informed (and output can be conditioned
on), and that workers do not get discretion if the principal is well informed. From such a simple theory
we would expect the degree of misallocation to be positively related to degree of discretion.
18level of discretion. However, with such a policy too much would be revealed about the
ability of individual workers, and in the long run the public sector could be drained of its
talent. Hence it might be that a certain amount of misallocation in the public sector is
desirable.29
4 Conclusion
We have considered a dynamic model of allocation of workers within Þrms with the distin-
guishing feature that Þrms face an adverse selection problem twice; when hiring workers
and when allocating workers within the Þrm. The second adverse selection problem is
created by the fact that workers have career concerns: they may have incentives to choose
tasks that are prestigious, but unproductive. To solve this problem, Þrms assign workers
to tasks, even though workers are better equipped to assess their correct task.
When the outside observability is low, the career motives are weak, and the Þrm can
construct a scheme that exploits the worker private information and ensures an e cient
allocation of workers. This scheme involves giving the workers full discretion over which
tasks to choose, i.e., a total absence of assignment. This type of equilibrium resembles
play in hi-tech Þrms like Sun Hydraulics and Gore & Ass., where employees are given an
extreme degree of discretion over which tasks to perform.
29Let us brießy discuss alternative methods to test the hypothesis that degree of discretion and misallo-
cation are negatively related. One testing strategy would be to obtain productivity and proÞt data from
a company performing a ’natural’ experiment, changing its practice from low worker discretion to high
worker discretion, and to test whether the productivity and proÞt of the Þrm goes up. A di!erent testing
strategy would be to combine techniques from stochastic front analysis (e.g., Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000),
which measures the distance from the e cient production frontier to actual production of Þrms, with
either survey data on discretion (such as those obtained by Osterman 1994), or with data on variables
that are likely to be correlated with degree of discretion, such as the number of employees per supervisor,
the extent of trainee programs, or the number of levels in the hierarchy in the Þrm. A third testing
strategy is more indirect and based on di!erences in mobility costs. For example can older workers be
expected to have higher moving costs than younger workers. This should make Þrms less anxious about
older workers being bid away, and hence we can — controlling for the fact that more may be known about
the ability of older workers — expect a higher discretion for older workers than for younger workers, and
hence a more e cient allocation within the Þrm for older workers than for younger workers.
19When the outside observability is higher, however, the career motives are stronger,
and the Þrm assigns workers to task, to avoid herding to the prestigious task. Equilibria
with a high degree of assignment rationing mirrors play in bureaucracies. Under such
assignment, too many workers are from an e ciency standpoint directed to the tasks
with high return to ability, like management, and too few perform ’simple’ tasks, such as
customer service or catalogue revision, from an e ciency standpoint. This is the same
type of ine ciency as implied by the Peter principle.
Furthermore, a higher level of worker discretion is associated with a lower degree of
wasted human resources due to misallocation within the Þrm. Hence we expect that the
Peter principle applies more in industries with a higher degree of outside observability,
such as in public bureaucracies, than in Þrms with a lower outside observability, such as
in hi-tech Þrms.
5 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly there cannot exist a pure strategy auction equilibrium.
We here derive the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Consider Þrst the equilibrium o!ers for a
worker who receives a good signal. Let us say that the outside Þrm uses a mixed strategy
with cumulative distribution Gg(x) and support S
g
outside = [ 0, ¯  g], where ¯  g <  H. The
inside Þrm will also use a mixed strategy with cumulative distribution of Fl for the low
worker and Fh for high worker. For a low worker, Fl will simply be the distribution




outside = Sg. Given that the inside
Þrm o!ers x to a high worker with a good signal (D), the inside Þrm will get,
G
g(x)( 
H   x), x ! S
g (A1)
where Gg(x) is the probability that the inside Þrm will win the auction, and ( H   x) is
the surplus he gets in the case he wins. Since the inside Þrm must be indi!erent at all
points in his support, we have that,
G
g(x)( 
H   x) = k
g




insideh is a constant. By integration, this constant equals the proÞts the inside
Þrm makes on high workers that get a good signal. Now deÞne the probability of a worker
20being a high type conditional on a good signal as !
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0   y), y ! S
g (A4)
By the same argument as for the inside Þrm, the outside Þrm must be indi!erent at all
points in his support. From Milgrom (1981), we know that the proÞts of the outside Þrm
must be zero. Hence the above expression must be zero. By inserting for y = ¯  g, we can




H + (1   !
g) 
0 (A5)
We now determine the cdf’s. From (A2) and inserting for x = ¯  g in (A1) to get k
g
insideh =
 H   ¯  g, we get that,
G
g(x) =
 H   ¯  g
 H   x
, where x ! S
g (A6)
Notice that this cdf places an atom at x =  0, where the magnitude of the atom equals
 H   ¯  g
 H    0. To determine F
g
h, insert for F
g








y    0
 H   y
, y ! S
g (A7)
Notice that this distribution does not place an atom at the lower end of the support. For
a worker with a bad signal, we use exactly the same procedure to get,
G
b(x) =
 H   ¯  b
 H   x
, where x ! S
b (A8)









insideh > 0, (A9)
21since ¯  g > ¯  b = !
b H +(1 !
b) 0. Hence, as expected, the informed Þrm makes a higher
proÞt on a (high) worker that receives a bad signal than a (high) worker that receives a








y    0
 H   y
, y ! S
b (A10)
which is an atomless distribution. Now the equilibrium (expected) wage for an agent
of type i. Clearly his expected wage just equals the expectation of the maximum o!er
conditional on the signal. First a low ability person. His expected wage equals,
w
E
2 =  
0[p(1   !
b) + (1   p)(1   !
g)] + p
Z ¯  b
 0
zg
b(z)dz + (1   p)
Z ¯  g
 0
zg
g(z)dz >  
0
(A11)
since the o!er from the outside Þrm fully determines his wage. On the other hand, the
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b(z) <  
H (A12)
Uniqueness follows directly from the argument.
The turnover rate for the low workers equals the fraction of low workers that receives
a (strictly) higher bid from the outside Þrm than from the inside Þrm at time 2, and half
of the workers that receive the same o!er from the two Þrms. Recall that the inside Þrm
always bids  0 for the low workers. Hence TL equals,
TL = p[1   1
2G
b( 















g are deÞned as in the previous proof. It follows immediately from (A13)
that this expression is positive. Now to the turnover rate of the high workers, which
equals,
TH = p
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22As with the low workers, it follows immediately from the expression that the turnover
rate for the high agents is positive. Notice that both TL and TH, and hence total turnover,
are increasing in !, since both !
b and !
g are increasing in !. Expressing the di!erence, we
Þnd that,


































b   !
g) (A15)
Since the second term on the right hand side always exceeds (-
1
2
), the turnover is always
higher for the low type workers than for the high type workers. Intuitively, if the realiza-
tion of the signal is E, the inside Þrm bids  0 if the worker is low, and F
g
h(y) if the worker
is high. So, conditional on the signal being E, the turnover is higher for low workers than
for high workers. The same type of argument applies if the value of the signal is D.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since  L will play no role in this proof, we can normalize
by setting  0 = 0 and  H = 1. In order for a low worker to choose the right task in the
Þrst period, the wage over a low worker’s career for choosing the E task must be at least































If this condition does not hold, either a low worker or a high worker has incentive to
allocate himself ine ciently. The only way to ensure an e cient allocation of workers is
to set wages such that (4) holds, and allow workers to choose their task. Hence workers
are given full discretion over task choice in a separating equilibrium.
23That wE
2 >  0 and wD
2 <  H are shown in Lemma 1. We now show that wD
1 <  H
and that wE
1 >  0. As can be seen from the auction equilibrium described in Appendix
A, the maximum average proÞt per worker made by a Þrm in the second period (which
occurs for p = 1
2) is equal to !(1   !). It follows that the maximum average wage in
the Þrst period equals ! + !(1   !), due to the zero proÞt condition.30 As can easily be
seen from this expression, the maximum average wage in the Þrst period cannot exceed
1. Furthermore, from Lemma 1 it follows that wE
1 > wD
1 in a separating equilibrium,
and hence wD
1 < 1. Second, the maximum average proÞt per worker in the Þrst period is
0 (which occurs for p = 1), and hence average wages must exceed ! in the Þrst period.
Since wE
1 > wD
1 , it follows that wE
1 > 0. Hence low (high) workers are paid more (less)
than their marginal productivity in both periods. In the proof of the third part of the
proposition, we also include the possibility of human capital acquisition, and this proof is
relegated to Appendix C.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start out by comparing the case p = 1/2 with the
case p = 1, and show that the conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium is more
restrictive in the latter case. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that c = h = 0 and
! = 1/2.
For p = 1, it follows that in a separating equilibrium, we must have that
w
E




2 =  
H, (4)








1 =  
0 (5)
30Zero proÞts across periods imply that,
2  = (1    )(wN
1 + wN
2 ) +  (wS
1 + wS
1)
where 2  is just the total productivity across periods, and the expression on the right hand side is the
total wage bill.
24We now check under which circumstances these wage o ers are consistent with equilibrium
in the game between Þrms. Suppose that Þrm 1 sticks to the wage schedule (wE
1 ,wD
1 ) and
Þrm 2 deviates by o ering the wage schedule (w’E
1 ,w’D





In that case, Þrm 2 would attract a share of the high workers while all the low workers
choose Þrm 1. Since w’D
1 is less than the marginal productivity of the high worker, Þrm
2 would run a proÞt, and hence the deviation (w’E
1 ,wD
1 ) would be proÞtable. However,
suppose a low worker also chooses to work for Þrm 2. Taking this possibility into account,
Þrm 2 may wish to revise w’E
1 . Denote this revised o er for w”E
1 . The point with o ering
w”E
1 instead of w’E
1 would be to give incentives for low workers to self allocate themselves
e!ciently. The productivity gain from making a low worker choose the E task instead of
the D task would be  0    L. The wage increase required to make this low worker prefer
the E task to the D task would be wD
2  wE
2 =  H   0. Hence, a Þrm would prefer to set
w”E
1 = wD
1 + ( H    0) =  H if
 
H    
0 <  
0    
L (6)
But in that case, (w”E
1 ,w’D
1 ) = (wE
1 ,wD
1 ), and the deviation by Þrm 2 is not credible.
Hence, Þrm 2 cannot only attract high ability workers and does not have additional
proÞts, and there exists a separating equilibrium when equation (7) holds. On the other
hand, when 2 0 <  L +  H, the Þrm can commit to setting w”E
1 < wE
1 and hence only
attract high workers.
We now use the same type of argument as above to show that the conditions for
existence of a separating equilibrium is less restrictive when p = 1
2 than when p = 1.
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2 <  
H (7)
For a separating equilibrium to be played, zero proÞts (across the two periods) imply,
ˆ w
E




1 >  
0 (8)
25Suppose that Þrm 2 deviates by o ering the wage schedule (ˆ w’E
1 ,ˆ w’D
1 ), where ˆ w’D
1 = ˆ wD
1
and ˆ w’E
1 < ˆ wE
1 . The productivity gain from making a low worker choose the E task
instead of the D task would, as before, be  0    L. The wage increase required to make
a low worker prefer the E task to the D task would, however, be ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2 <  H    0.
Hence, a Þrm would prefer to set ˆ w”E
1 = ˆ wD
1 + ( ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2 ) = ˆ wE
1 <  H if
ˆ w
D
2   ˆ w
E
2 <  
0    
L, (9)
in which case a separating equilibrium exists. Since ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2 <  H    0, the condition
for existence of a separating equilibrium is less restrictive for p = 1
2 than for p = 1.
For general p, to prove the result it is necessary that wD
2   wE
2 increases with p in a
separating equilibrium, which is shown in Lemma 1.31
Proof of Proposition 3. We start out by proving the existence of a rationing
equilibrium where the number of slots in the E task is restricted, and then prove the
impossibility of a rationing equilibrium where the slots in the D task is rationed. Finally,
we prove that the degree of rationing is increasing in p. We start out by assuming p = 1
and then consider the case p = 1
2. The case p ! (1
2,1) is considered in Appendix B.
For p = 1, when  0 < ( L + H)/2 then a deviating Þrm will have incentive to higher
the wage of task E once the workers have chosen that Þrm, and hence there does not
exist a separating equilibrium. Suppose that a Þrm chooses a schedule so that the high
workers prefer to work in task D, and the low workers prefer to work in task E. However,
the Þrm allows only a fraction f of the workers that prefer task E to enter task E. The
complementary fraction of workers, (1-f), is forced to work in task D (the admission to
31One may notice that an inside Þrm generates proÞts from a worker switching to the E task by both
the increase of e!ciency and the usefulness of the knowledge gained. Why do we only take into account
the former and not the latter in the deviation condition? The answer rests in that the gain from the
knowledge is solely from the outside Þrm’s beliefs about f. The outside Þrm’s strategy is a mixed strategy
with support starting from  0. An informed inside Þrm can extract all the surplus of his knowledge for
a D task worker by placing a bid at  0 + ². Likewise, an uninformed inside Þrm can also make this bid
and lose ² for all the E task workers he would have avoided. As one can see, this extra cost is negligable
for small ². Thus, the inside Þrm’s value of information is actually worthless. All that matters is that
the outside Þrm thinks he has such information.
26task E is allocated in a way such that the Þrm does not learn the type of those workers










Moreover, second period wages must satisfy,
w
E





! H + (1   !)(1   f) 0
1   f(1   !)
(10)
Any value of f makes the equations consistent, and we now put restrictions on f. If f is
high, then a deviating Þrm can make a proÞt by the procedure described in the previous
result. On the other hand, if f is low, the Þrm will lose money on mis-allocation. So,
equilibrium is a situation where f is the maximal value that is consistent with there not
existing a proÞtable deviation. A deviating Þrm can only make a proÞtable deviation if,
w
D
2   w
E
2 "  
0    
L (11)




(1 + !) 0   ! H    L
( 0    L)(1   !)
(12)
Notice that when  0 >  L+ H
2 , then f  > 1, and we get a separating equilibrium. The
case f  # 0 is considered in a remark below.
We now prove (ii), that there cannot be rationing equilibrium where the number of
slots in task D is restricted. If the number of slots in task D is restricted, there are two
possibilities. First, it can be the case that both types wish to work in task D. In that
case, the proportion of workers should be the same in both jobs. If this happens, there
are no career concerns since no information inferred by task choice. Because of this, the
Þrm can induce a high worker switch from task E to task D, by paying the same wage in
task D as in task E. Such a scheme would increase productivity without increasing costs.
So in equilibrium, it cannot be the case that both types of workers wish to work in task
D. The second possibility is that the low type wishes to work in task E, while the high
27type workers wish to work in task D. In that case, total wages must be equalized across
tasks. But then, the Þrm can increase proÞts by allowing a higher fraction of workers
in task D, by allowing workers to move from task E to task D (since only high workers
would wish to move). This occurs since both the wage in task D is lower than in task E
(since the fraction of high workers in task D is higher than in task E) and productivity of
high workers is higher in task D. Hence a situation where the slots in task E is rationed
cannot be an equilibrium.
That the degree of rationing is higher for p = 1 than for p = 1
2 follows from a very
similar argument to why wD
2   wE
2 is higher for p = 1 than for p = 1
2 (Proposition 2).32
The case with general p numerically yields the same type of results, and is considered in
Appendix B.
6 Appendix B: Numerical Analysis
In this appendix, we perform a numerical analysis of the claims made in Lemma 1, part
(ii), and Proposition 3, part (iii).33 First, for the claim of Lemma 1, we show that
 w2 := wD
2   wE
2 is increasing in p (from which Proposition 2 follows). Second, for the
claim of Proposition 3, we show that the degree of rationing is increasing in p.
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2
To show that a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower p (Proposition 2),
we need to check that  w2 := wD
2   wE
2 is increasing in p (Lemma 1).34





in p, and Þnally consider numerical analysis for general !. From Appendix A, we know
32The outline of the proof goes as follows. Given a certain degree of rationing, f, the wage di erence
wD
2   wE
2 is greater at p = 1 than at p = 1
2. The wage di erence wD
2   wE
2 at p = 1 is also increasing in
f. Since the equilibrium f is the f such that wD
2  wE
2 =  0  L, the equilibrium f has to be decreasing
from p = 1
2 to p = 1.
33All calculations and graphs are generated in Maple V. The worksheets are available from the authors.
34The reason why it is di!cult to prove analytically that  w2 is increasing in p is that while wD
2 is
always increasing in p, surprisingly wE
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Observe that,
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Moreover notice that,
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We then have that,
 w2 = w
D
2   w
E
2 =  
0    
H + ( 
H    
0)[(3p   1)!
g + (2   3p)!
b]  
( 
H    




g + 1   2p)ln(1   !
g) + (1   !
b)(
1   p
!
b + 2p   1)ln(1   !
b)]
=  
0    
H + ( 
H    
0)[(3p   1)!
g + (2   3p)!
b]  
 H    0
!
[(1   !
g)(1   p)ln(1   !
g) + (1   !
b)pln(1   !
b)] (B7)
29Notice that for ! = 1
2, we have that !
g = p and !
b = 1 p, and hence (B7) reduces to (we




2 =  1 + (3p   1)p + (2   3p)(1   p)   2[(1   p)
2 ln(1   p) + p
2 lnp] (B8)




= 4[(1   p)ln(1   p)   (1   p)   (pln(p)   p)] > 0 (B9)
This expression is greater than zero because xln(x)   x is decreasing in x for x ! (0,1).
Hence we have shown that  w2 is increasing in p for   = 1
2. We expect a proof of the case
with general   to be along the same lines, but signiÞcantly more cumbersome. In absence
of an analytical proof, we now plot  w2 for other values of   (still using the normalization
!0 = 0 and !H = 1),
Figure 2
The Þgure plots  w2 as a function of p for   = .1 (bottom line),   = .3,   = .5,   = .7,
  = .9 (top line). As can be seen from the Þgure,  w2 is increasing in p for all the values
of  . This Þnding has been conÞrmed by extensive numerical analysis.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We now show that the degree of rationing is increasing in p, or in other words that f  is
decreasing in p (Proposition 3 (iii)).
30Denote the wages in the second period of a rationing equilibrium as ˆ wD
2 and ˆ wE
2 .
To determine ˆ wD
2 and ˆ wE
2 , we work with the same equations as before, except that   is
replaced by ˆ  , and !H is replaced by b !
H, where
ˆ   =   + (1   f)(1    )
b !
H =
 !H + (1   f)(1    )!0
ˆ  
(B10)
where ˆ   is the expected share of workers that choose the D task in the Þrst period, and
where !H is the expected productivity of those workers in the second period (since workers
choose their e cient task in the second period, !L does not enter the expression). Once
workers have chosen a Þrm, this Þrm can alter its proÞts by inducing low workers to switch
to the E task. To induce a low worker to switch, a Þrm must pay him an extra ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2 .
The productivity improvement from him switching is !0   !L. There is also gains from
knowledge by having him switch. The overall gain from knowledge is equal to the expected
proÞts in period 2 from being the inside Þrm. We can derive this expression by realizing
that the inside Þrm is playing a mixed strategy and thus indi!erent to every strategy in
his support. Therefore, we can look at his expected proÞt if he chose the highest wage and





p · (Gg)!1(1) + (1   p) · (Gb)!1(1)
¢¤
.
Note that this expression is zero when either f = 0 or p = 1.Since a Þrm wants to choose
an f to maximize the joint gains from switching (knowledge and productivity) minus
increased wage costs. Hence,
f
  = arg max
f"[0,1]











+   · f · [!
0   !
L   ( ˆ w
D




For the expressions we have checked, f  is unique, and we expect this to hold generally.
We now plot f  against p, using (B8), (B10), and (B11), and insert the parameter values
used in Example 1, except that we let   be a free parameter (in addition to p).The Þgure
plots f  against p, for varying values of   [  = .3 (top line),   = .5, and   = .7,(bottom
line)]. The Þgure shows that f  is decreasing in p for all values of  . Extensive numerical
analysis conÞrms that point. Hence we have substantiated that the degree of rationing is
increasing in p.
31Figure 1: Figure 3
7 Appendix C: More on Wage Dynamics in Separat-
ing Equilibria
In this appendix, we consider the wage dynamics of separating equilibria. In addition
to a cost of e!ort, c, we assume throughout the appendix that (general) human capital
acquisition results in second period productivities g(.), where g(!L,!0,!H) = (!L+h,!0+
h,!H+h), i.e., that the increase in productivity between the two periods is uniform across
workers (and tasks).35
7.1 Proof of the third part of Proposition 1
We Þrst show that high workers have a steeper wage dynamics than a low worker in a
separating equilibrium, provided c or h not too high. DeÞne the slope of the wage dynamics
35SpeciÞc human capital acquisition has a similar e!ect to introducing switching costs, in that any
positive level of turnover would be ine cient. Proportional human capital acquisition, of the form
g( L, 0, H) = h( L, 0, H), where h > 1, would yield the same type of results as the speciÞcation
chosen.


















We show that !E < !D for c or h not too high. Clearly, for c = h = 0, the denominator
of !E is higher than the denominator of !D, since wE
1 > wD
1 in that case. Also, from
wE
1 > wD
1 and the fact that wE
2 < wD
2 it follows that the numerator of !E is smaller than
the numerator of !D. Hence it follows that !E < !D for c = h = 0. We now consider
the e!ect of introducing c, h > 0 on !i. Assuming that a separating equilibrium exists





















As can easily be seen from these expressions, !0D > !0E for any c given that h is zero, and
!0D > !0E for any h given that c is zero. !0D < !0E requires that both c and h are larger
than zero. We assume that c,h > 0. Brießy, c > 0 plays the role of ensuring that high
workers are paid more than low workers in the Þrst period in a separating equilibrium,
and h > 0 plays the role of ensuring that wages are increasing through time for both type
of workers.
7.2 Further results on wage dynamics of separating equilibria
We now show that for su ciently high c and h, a separating equilibrium satisÞes:
• High workers earn more than low workers in both periods.
• Wages increase over time for both types of workers.
33Assume that there exists a separating equilibrium for the exogenous parameters {c =





#1. Further suppose that there exists a separating equilibrium for the exogenous param-
eters {ˆ c > 0,ˆ h > 0,!H + ˆ c,!0,!L, } = "2, with equilibrium wages given by #2. Notice
that with ˆ c > 0, Þrms must condition period 2 wages on task choice in period 2 (in ad-
dition to the information about task choice in period 1) to obtain e cient allocation, in
contrast to the case when c = 0. SpeciÞcally, to obtain an e cient allocation of workers
at time 2, Þrms will o!er the workers that choose the D task an ‘overtime payment’, or
bonus, of ˆ c. The wage vector #2 is characterized by four elements, {ˆ wE
1 , ˆ wD
1 , ˆ wE




1 ) is the period 1 equilibrium wage for a worker that chooses the E (D)
task in period 1, and where ˆ wE
2 (ˆ wD
2 ) is the expected wage in period 2 when choosing
the E (D) task in period 1, conditional on choosing the E (D) task in period 2. We then
have that #2 = {wE
1 ,wD
1 + ˆ c,wE
2 + ˆ h,wD
2 + ˆ c + ˆ h}. The reason for this is twofold. First
consider the e!ect of the human capital acquisition factor h. As can easily be conÞrmed
from the auction equilibrium of Proposition 1, the e!ect of introducing h to second period
wages is simply to increase wages by h, independently of ability and independently of the
task choice. Moreover, wages in the Þrst period are not a!ected by h, because the wage
di!erence in the second period is not a!ected by h. Now consider the e!ect of the positive
cost of e!ort in the D task, ˆ c. Taking into account the e!ect of h, the productivities in
"2 net of e ort is the same as the productivities in "1. Therefore, taking into account
h, the equilibrium wages net of e!ort must be the same. It can easily be shown, and is
hence omitted, that given that a separating equilibrium exists for "1, there must exist a
separating equilibrium for "2.
Proof. To show that ˆ wD
1 can be higher than ˆ wE
1 , provided c large enough, notice that
for a separating equilibrium it must be the case that
ˆ w
E
1 + ˆ w
E
2 = ˆ w
D
1 + ˆ w
D
2   2c (17)
which holds if c >
ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2
2 . However, since ˆ wD
2   ˆ wE
2 <  H    0, there must exist a range
of c such that a separating equilibrium exists (see Proposition 2), and moreover where
ˆ wD
1 > ˆ wE
1 . To show that ˆ wE
2 (ˆ wD
2 ) can be larger than ˆ wE
1 (ˆ wD
1 ) for high enough h is trivial
and hence omitted.
348 Appendix D: Performance Contracts
Our justiÞcation for not having (a measure of) individual performance as a contractible
variable is that for many production processes, measuring individual contribution to prof-
its that go beyond the measurement of e ort can be very costly and noisy task.36 More-
over, the assumption is consistent with a large empirical literature that shows that real-life
payment schemes to a little extent depends on such measures (see Prendergast, 2000). The
purpose of the appendix is to show that even when individual output is contractible, the
equilibrium contracts can be similar or identical to the (Þxed-wage) contracts analyzed
in the main text. We illustration, we consider the case when e ort is supplied inelasti-
cally, and where the wage to a worker can only be made conditional on a measure of his
individual output.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one period, and moreover that c = 0. To
make our task harder, we assume a very weak form of risk aversion: workers maximize
expected (total) wages, but for a given level of (expected) wages, workers prefer a lower-
risk scheme to a higher-risk scheme.37 If workers are indi erent given this criterion, they
choose their e!cient task.38
From the assumptions made on risk preferences, we can conÞne attention to contracts
of the following (linear) form,
w = !0 + !YY (C1)
where Y is the (observed) output of an agent, !0 is the salary, and !Y is the bonus. We
assume that in the E task, the output  0 is certain, while the output in the D task is not
perfectly observable. Yi has two possible levels,  g and  b,where  b <  H <  g. An H
worker in the di!cult task has a pH probability of  g, while an L worker in the di!cult
36For example, several papers within human resource management report how middle managers are re-
luctant to give individual performance reports for their subordinates. And, as described in the motivating
example, the measurement of individual output can be very complex with team processes.
37More general risk preferences give qualitatively the same type of result, but would add technical
problems with existence of equilibrium (similar to in Rotschild & Stiglitz, 1975)
38This assumption is made solely for convenience.
35task has a pL probability of obtaining  g, where pL < pH. We assume that,
pH g + (1   pH) b =  
H
pL g + (1   pL) b =  
L (C2)
As can readily be seen, the deterministic technology studied in the previous sections is
obtained for the special case pH = 1,  g =  H, pL = 0, and  b =  L. We have the
following result.
Proposition 6 For su ciently high  0 equilibrium contracts will be arbitrarily close Þxed-
wage (as in the main part of the paper).
Proof. We assume that there exists an equilibrium where the L workers choose the
E task and get the wage  0, while the H workers choose the D task and get the scheme
w = !0 + !YY . For (!0, !Y) to be consistent with equilibrium, it must maximize the
utility of the high type, given zero proÞts and given that the low type prefers to work in
the E task. Self-selection of low workers implies that,
!0 + !Y(pL g + (1   pL) b) !  
0 (C3)
while zero proÞt in the D task implies that,
!0 + !Y(pH g + (1   pH) b) =  
H (C4)
The second condition determines the salary as,
!0 =  
H(1   !Y) (C5)
Since high workers prefer a lower risk to a higher risk, the self-selection constraint is
binding, and we get that,
!Y =
 0   !0
pL g + (1   pL) b
(C6)
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pL g +  b    H    bpL
(C7)




Y) converges to ( 0,0), as  0
approaches  H.
Intuitively, when  0 is high, the self-selection constraint becomes easier to satisfy, and
hence !Y can be lowered and still self-selection occurs. When  0 approaches  H, we get
that !Y can be close to zero without self-selection being violated, and since workers are
risk averse, the equilibrium !Y will in fact be close to zero as  0 increases.
Since there is no intrinsic reason why  0 should be close to  H, the result does not
seem too strong. However, by adding a cost of monitoring, m, where 0 < m <  H    0,
for obtaining a performance measure, one can add realism to the result. As can easily be
veriÞed, the result is that when m is su!ciently high (so that  H    0 is close to zero),
the equilibrium performance contracts are close to the (Þxed-wage) contracts considered
in the previous sections.
Even if the su!cient condition outlined in Proposition 5 does not hold, there are
circumstances under which performance contracts will not be used in equilibrium even if
individual output is contractible. One set of circumstances is when workers can commit
ex-ante to contractual form (e.g., through labor unions), as the following result shows.
Proposition 7 If workers can commit to contractual form ex-ante to discovering their
ability, equilibrium contracts may consist of Þxed wages even if performance contracts were
available.
Proof. Assume that (0 < pl < ( E    b)/( g    b) < ph < 1), that is, for e!ciency
H workers should be in the D task, while L workers should be in the E task. In addition,
assume that the proportion of H workers " is such that "(ph g + (1   ph) b) + (1  
")(pl g +(1 pl) b) !  E; that is, it is better that all the workers are allocated to the E
task than that all the workers is allocated to the D. (This helps guarantee the existence
of a separating equilibrium.) When Þrms compete for workers by o ering contingent
contracts, workers choosing the E task would be paid  E, and workers in D task would






s.t. phwg + (1   ph)wb ! ph g + (1   ph) b)
Eul(wg,wb) ! u( E) (C8)
This type of equilibrium is similar to Rothschild & Stiglitz (1975) except we include
the moral-hazard of job selection as well. If one cannot write contracts contingent upon
outcome, then the equilibrium contract would be w! such that w! = "(ph g+(1 ph) b)+
(1 ") E. Notice that when workers are risk-averse u(w!) > "Eu(wg,wb)+(1 ")u( E).
Such a contract cannot occur when contingent contracts are available, since one would be
able to skim the good workers. This implies that it is best for the ex-ante for the workers
to prevent contingent contracts.
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